British Mistakes During the Revolutionary War Essay

While thither are numerous contributing factors to the Statess success in achieving independence, the about(prenominal) critical factor sess be attributed to the series of British mistakes throughout the conflict. prior to the assault of the Revolutionary state of contendfare, the British disposal faced estimable challenges, both politically and fiscally. The conclusion of the French and Indian fight coupled with the fighting in Europe, India and the westerly Indies, left Britain with considerable debt and with few to piddling allies. The British presidency saw the States as a way to give revenue in order to serve well in its rec e rattlingplacey efforts. The fiscal tense in a post-war economy as well as various sexual struggles with foreign policy, bureaucratic processes and growing affect amongst its citizens regarding the war set the stage which in the long run ended in America defeating what was the near world-beaterful military in the world. The adjacent paragraphs address specific reasons as to wherefore the British failed to achieve and endure a strategicalalal advantage during the American Revolution. politics governanceFrom the onset of the war, the British failed to fork out a cohesive and unified strategic vision for the dispute with America. The organizational expression and political system was not oddly efficient in decision fashioning or policy put togetherwork impressiont. Decision do was lengthy and critical information and strategic decisions were done individually and often in a dispersed manner. This process considerably added to the frustrations held by the American colonialists. In addition, the British military neer had one fix leader to provide and everyplacesee a clear strategic direction of the war effort (Professor Carpenter, NWC lecture).There were often nature clashes in the midst of military restrainters, heads of state and early(a) influential mathematical functions not to mention th e far-flung corruption throughout all government entities which further complicated the situation. As a result of the French and Indian War, the British soldiery had as well as reduced the estimate of regiments. Both Naval and Army budgets were shortened resulting in less than half the rides than at the height of the previous war. The demands of defending a national guard as well as other critical areas such as Ireland and Gibraltar stretched forces and provided additional challenges (Professor Carpenter, NWC lecture).In addition, recruiting was also a problem, particularly for British regiments stationed in America. end-to-end the war the government experienced neat difficulty in obtaining sufficient men for the ranks. Again and again it was found unrealistic to complete the augmentation voted by parliament (Recruiting of Army, Chapter 3). These inside conflicts and issues led to poor command and pull wires and ineffective strategic leading which lacked gluiness and u nity. Failure to Understand the True temperament of WarIn order to adequately assess the British perspective of the American colonists, we must first explore the varying aspects of the environment. The British government struggled on how to sufficiently deal with the uprising in America. great power George III, a great believer in preserving the British imperial interests, believed a British consummation of brute force would force allegiance and submission. Although he himself didnt demand the authority, he tomboyed an agile role in persuading Parliament into taking challenge by overtaking various hear American cities. The British assumed this disposition of force would demolish motivation and secure the Americans to cooperate. This onset turn out to be flawed. The British didnt fancy that the American complaints come to on theories of constitution, economic independence and religious concepts.Supply Chain ManagementIn the case of the American Revolution, supply set up management will be approached from two different perspectives, the provisioning of military as well as the overall colloquy dodging with regard to logistics and movement of resources. Both play a critical and equally big role in any raise up and during the American Revolution both installd to be a detriment to the British forces. From early on the British were confronted with serious challenges with providing provisions for phalanx operating in America. During the war, British provisioning strategy relied heavily on sustainment support to come from the homeland. The three hundred0-mile depend on turn up to a tactical obstruction in feeding the troops as well as resupplying with ammunition, blankets, shoes and armament. ofttimes taking several months to arrive, the supplies arrived spoiled and unusable. gain amplifying the issue, the U.S. Continental Congress authorized levelheaded piracy which attributed to the seizing of over 300 British ships during the war.In ad dition to the resupply of troops, deficient and ineffective use of transportation resources small-scale British effectiveness on the battlefield. ascribable to poor planning and negligent communication between commanders, the various transport agencies utilize to resupply the British army struggled with prioritizing missions and did not in effect communicate with each other. In addition, independent decisions were made to keep units on-station to move troops vice sending rearwards to resupply. Misaligned drift plans and the lack of communication and collaboration among commanders resulted in a confused supply filament and complications for command and control. This eventually slowed logistics support to troops and reduced British sustainment on the battlefield.Failure to Maximize sea officeMahan advocates a successful navy must adopt and utilize an offensive strategy. From the onset of the American Revolution, the British did well in meeting this requirement and until the French entered the war, the British displayed an overwhelming nautical superiority over the Americans, largely due to the fact that the American colonists did not stomach any maritime forces. In the end, however, the British failed in sustain oceanic superiority when France and Spain entered the war. Their inability can be attributed to several critical areas chastening to adequately reinvest in the replenishment of its scud, mishap to train and equip its service members, and mishap to effectively leverage naval forces in key campaigns Saratoga and Yorktown in particular. The 3000 mile supply chain, limited resources, piracy and lack of synergy among leadership and transferral agencies did not allow for the British fleet to organize themselves for sustainment purposes nor establish, enforce and maintain sea power.Mahan maintains the two major strategies for a strong sea power is a powerful Navy and a roomy reaching commerce (Mahan, Sea Power, p. 539). In order to adequatel y defeat the opposite, Britain required to capitalize on the lack of naval power prior to Frances transfix into the war. By not taking provide steps to keep France out the war, the British effectively positioned themselves for failure. Mahan completely disagreed with how the British penalize naval warfare after the French and Spanish entered the war. He believed that the British should fox taken a more active approach in blockading European ports in order to bring the naval fight back to European soil.Mahan express the whole fortune of the war should at the first have been staked on a concentration of the English fleet between Brest and Cadiz. (Mahan, Sea Power, 415). It was his belief that this effort would have not only weakened the state-supported support for the war but would also bring the forces of the American allies back to Europe to contest the blockades. In addition, the British naval forces would also benefit from the much(prenominal) shorter supply chain in the point that their naval assets required repair. British leadership once again failed to see the strategic connection between sea power and the unified strategic vision (Carpenter, NWC Lecture).Identifying Centers of sombrenessA center of somberness is invariably found where the mass is concentrated most densely (On War, p.485). Correctly identifying the center of gravity or the hub of all power and movement, for which everything depends is ultimately the most critical part of defeating the enemy (On War, p. 596). Flawed identification can prove to be costly in call of resources, time and effectiveness on the battlefield. The British strategy during 1777-78 was to isolate colonies and systematically get down the enemy. In order to execute, the strategy refer identifying and targeting large conglomerates of go ups, in other manner of speaking attacking American cities. The British scholarship was by capturing cities like New York and Philadelphia the rebel forces would view this overtaking and inevitably force submission to the colonialist.The mistake in the British perception was identifying American cities as the centers of gravity. They failed to understand that the center of gravity was the Continental Army and the overwhelming public support for independence. This misapprehension was demonstrated by British common Howe when he attempted to seize Philadelphia in order to lure General working capital to fight.The problem was that he attempted this operation independently, diverging from the planned strategy of sharp off and controlling the waterways coming in from Canada. Howe failed to understand that the center of gravity for the American colonists did not lie within a city but more in popular support for independence. In addition, by not supporting the established planned, his actions ultimately contributed to the defeat in the Battle of Saratoga. This caseful not only exhibits how the British misapprehend the center of gravity but also sho ws the command and control issues the British had as well.Lack of Diplomatic Processarguably the most significant factor in Britains dying was the failure to treat diplomatically from the onset of the conflict and routinely throughout. As the French and Indian War winded down, the British Empire was grand, very pompous and displayed signs of arrogance. This overconfidence contributed to why they didnt show concern in addressing the demand of the American colonists more diplomatically. This allowed the colonist to slip of paper their focus to complete independence and prove their resolve for a representative democracy. Had they bust understood the American objections and drive, they could have taken a more proactive approach to amicably reach a consensus and the war may have been prevented.The Americans, on the other, knew the splendour of diplomatic relationships. This was demonstrated with the alliances they built with France, Spain and the Netherlands. These relationships proved to be a vital put of their strategy. The British Army had several advantages over the colonial forces size, training, experience, financial support, etc. by the international relations that were forged, America reaped some(prenominal) benefits of financial support, ammunitions, manpower and most importantly naval support. These relationships proved to be a decisive factor in the American victory.ConclusionOverall the British demise during the American Revolution can be attributed to several key areas lack of a unified strategy, limited to no command and control, lack of synchronization among troops, government organizational structure, untimely and unresponsive decision reservation and ineffective supply chain management. In addition, the adopted naval strategy failed to establish an effective naval strategy to subdue French and Spanish forces thereby increase difficulties on the battlefield. By not all the way understanding the nature war and never really defining an overarching objective, British leadership repeatedly encountered logistic and tactical challenges were proved to be fatal for their success.BibliographyCarpenter, NWC lecture trigger-happy Team Britain and the American War for emancipation Clausewitz, C. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1989. Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York Dover, 1987. The Recruiting of the Army. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution, Chapter 3. http//americanrevolution.org/britisharmy3.html.